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A  
L E T T E R  
T O  
JOHN DUNNING, Esq.

B Y  
Mr. H O R N E.

Vengono di quelle occasioni che tutto serve:  
E dice il proverbio a questo proposito;  
*Impara l'arte, e mettila da parte.*

GOLDONI.

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L O N D O N:  
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A

L E T T E R, &c.

Dear Sir;

IT would be worse than superfluous in me even to hint to you why none of the reasons given for over-ruling my Exception are satisfactory to my mind. But there is something very curious in the Precedent of the King and Lawley, which, I am persuaded; neither those who took the Exception, nor perhaps the Judges who decided that case (though the reason they gave destroys the effect of the Precedent towards me), nor the Judge who quoted it, were aware of.

As it is intirely out of the line of the profession, and its novelty may perhaps afford you some entertainment; as it is an offering worthy your acceptance, and cannot be presented to you by any other hand, I intreat your forgiveness for laying it before you.

The Precedent of that *supposed* omission is produced to justify a real omission in the Information against me: when indeed there was no omission in the Information against Lawley. But the

Averment said to be omitted, was, not only substantially, but *literally* made.

“The exception taken was, that it was not positively averred that Crooke was indicted; it was only laid that she sciens that Crooke had been indicted and was to be tried for forgery, did so and so.”

—“She knowing that Crooke had been indicted for forgery, did so and so.”—

That is, *literally* thus,

—“Crooke had been indicted for forgery,” (there is the averment literally made)—“She, knowing that, did so and so.”—

Such, Sir, is, in all cases, the unsuspected construction, not only in our own but in every language in the world, where the Conjunction *THAT* (or some equivalent word) is employed. I speak it confidently, because I know (and, with Lord Monboddo's permission, *a priori*) that it must be so; and I have likewise tried it in a great variety of languages, antient as well as modern, Asiatic as well as European.

I am very well aware, Sir, that, should I stop here, what I have now advanced would seem very puerile; and a mere quibbling trick or play upon words; founded upon the fortuitous similarity of sound between *THAT* the Article or Pronoun, as it is called, and *THAT* the Conjunction: between which two, though they have the same sound, it is universally imagined that there is not any the smallest correspondence or similarity of signification. But I deny that any words change their nature in this manner, so as to belong sometimes to one part of speech and sometimes to another, from the different manner of using them. I never could perceive any such fluctuation in any word whatever:  
though



though I know it is a general charge brought erroneously against words of almost every denomination. But it is all, Error; arising from the false measure which has been taken of almost every sort of words. Whilst the words themselves continue faithfully and steadily attached, each to the standard under which it was originally enlisted. As the word *THAT* does; which, however used and employed, and however named and classed, always retains one and the same signification. Unnoticed abbreviation in construction, and difference of position, have caused this appearance of fluctuation; and (since the time of the elder Stoics) have misled the Grammarians and Philosophers of all languages both antient and modern: for in all they make the same mistake.

If I should ask any of these gentlemen, whether it is not strange and improper that we should, without any reason or necessity, employ in English the same word for two different meanings and purposes; would he not readily acknowledge that it was wrong, and that he could see no reason for it, but many reasons against it? Well, then is it not more strange that this same impropriety, in this same case, should run through *ALL* languages? And that they should *ALL* use an *Article*, without any reason, unnecessarily, and improperly, for this *same* Conjunction; with which it has, as is pretended, no correspondence nor similarity of signification? Yet this is certainly done in *ALL* languages; as any one may easily find by inquiry. Now does not the uniformity and universality of this supposed mistake and unnecessary impropriety (in languages which have no connexion with each other) naturally lead us to suspect that this usage

of the Article may perhaps be neither mistaken nor improper ; but that the mistake may lie only with us, who do not understand it? I will make use of the leisure which Imprisonment affords me, to examine a few Instances ; and, still keeping the same signification of the sentences, shew, by a resolution of their construction, the truth of my assertion.

## EXAMPLE.

“ I wish you to believe THAT I would not wilfully hurt a Fly.”

## RESOLUTION.

“ I would not wilfully hurt a Fly, I wish you to believe THAT” (assertion).

## EXAMPLE.

“ You say THAT the same arm which when contracted can lift —, when extended to its utmost reach will not be able to raise — : You mean THAT we should never forget our situation, and THAT we should be prudently contented to do good within our sphere, where it can have an effect : and THAT we should not be misled, even by a virtuous benevolence and public spirit, to waste ourselves in fruitless efforts beyond our power of Influence.”

## RESOLUTION.

“ The same arm which when contracted can lift —, when extended to its utmost reach will not be able to raise — : You say THAT. We should never forget our situation ; you mean THAT. And we should be contented to do good within our own sphere, where it can have an effect ; you mean

“ mean THAT. And we should not be misled  
 “ even by a virtuous benevolence and public  
 “ spirit to waste ourselves in fruitless efforts be-  
 “ yond our power of influence; you mean THAT.

EXAMPLE.

“ They who have well considered THAT king-  
 “ doms rise or fall, and THAT their inha-  
 “ bitants are happy or miserable, not so much  
 “ from any local or accidental advantages, or dis-  
 “ advantages; but accordingly as they are well or  
 “ ill governed; may best determine how far a  
 “ virtuous mind can be neutral in Politics.”

RESOLUTION.

“ Kingdoms rise or fall, not so much from  
 “ any local or accidental advantages or disadvan-  
 “ tages, but accordingly as they are well or ill  
 “ governed; they who have considered THAT  
 “ (maxim), may best determine how far a vir-  
 “ tuous mind can be neutral in Politics. And  
 “ the inhabitants of kingdoms are happy or mi-  
 “ serable not so much from any local or acci-  
 “ dental advantages or disadvantages, but accor-  
 “ dingly as they are well or ill governed; they  
 “ who have considered THAT, may best determine  
 “ how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in Po-  
 “ litics.”

EXAMPLE.

“ Thieves rise by night, THAT they may cut  
 “ men’s throats.”

RESOLUTION.

“ Thieves may cut men’s throats, (for) THAT  
 (purpose) they rise by night.”

After the same manner may all sentences be re-  
 solved, where the supposed conjunction THAT  
 (or

(or its equivalent) is employed: and by such resolution it will always be discovered to have merely the same force and signification, and to be in fact nothing else but an Article.

And this is not the case in English alone, where THAT is the only Conjunction of the same signification which we employ in this manner; but this same method of resolution takes place in those languages also which have different Conjunctions for this same purpose: for the original of my last example (where UT is employed, and not the Latin neuter article QUOD,) will be resolved in the same manner.

“ UT jugulent homines surgunt de nocte Latrones.”

For though Sanctius, who struggled so hard to withdraw QUOD from amongst the Conjunctions, still left UT amongst them without molestation; yet is UT no other than the Greek Article οτι, adopted for this conjunctive purpose by the Latins, and by them originally written UTI: the ο being changed into υ from that propensity which both the antient Romans had and the modern Italians still have, upon many occasions, to pronounce even their own ο like an υ. Of which I need not produce any instances\*. The resolution therefore of the original will be like that of the translation.

“ Latrones jugulent homines (Δι) οτι surgunt de nocte.”

I shall not at this time stop here to account etymologically for the different words which some other languages (for there are others beside the

(\*) “ Quant à la voyelle υ, pource qu'ils (*les Italiens*) l'aiment fort, ainsi que nous cognoissons par ces mots *ufficio*, *ubrigato*, &c. je pense bien qu'ils la respectent plus que les autres.” *Henry Estienne, de la precellence du langage François.*

Latin) employ in this manner instead of their own article: though, if it were exacted from me, I believe I should not refuse the undertaking; although it is not the easiest part of etymology: for Abbreviation and Corruption are always busiest with the words which are most frequently in use.

Perhaps it may be thought that, though this method of resolution will answer with most sentences, yet that there is one usage of the conjunction **THAT** which it will not explain.

I mean in such instances as this:

“ IF **THAT** the King

“ Have any way your good deserts forgot,

“ He bids you name your griefs.”

How are we to bring out the Article **THAT**, when two Conjunctions, as it often happens, come in this manner together?

The truth of the matter is that **IF** is merely a *Verb*. It is merely the Imperative mood of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon Verbs **FIKAN**, **Līpan**; and in those languages, as well as in the English formerly, this supposed Conjunction was pronounced and written as the common Imperative, purely **FIk**, **Līf**, **Gif**.---Thus in B. Johnson's *Sad Shepherd* (which, though it be

“ such wool

“ As from mere English flocks his muse could

“ pull”

I agree with its author,

“ Is a fleece,

“ To match or those of Sicily or Greece”)

it is thus written,

“ My Largeſſe

“ Hath lotted her to be your brother's miſ-

“ treſſe,

“ **GIF**

“ GIVE she can be reclaim’d ; GIVE not, his prey.”

And accordingly our corrupted IF has always the signification of the present English Imperative GIVE, and no other. So that the resolution of the construction in the instance I produced from Shakespeare, will be as before in the others.

“ The King may have forgotten your good deserts ; GIVE THAT in any way ; he bids you name your griefs.”

And here, as an additional proof, we may observe, that whenever the *Datum*, upon which any conclusion depends, is a sentence ; the *Article* THAT, if not expressed, is always understood and may be inserted after IF. As in the instance I have produced above, the Poet might have said

“ GIVE (THAT) *she can be reclaim’d*, &c.

For the resolution is,

“ *She can be reclaim’d*, GIVE THAT ; *my largeesse hath lotted her to be your brother’s mistresse. She cannot be reclaim’d*, GIVE THAT ; *my largeesse hath lotted her to be your brother’s Prey.*”

But the *Article*, THAT, is not understood, and cannot be inserted after IF ; where the *Datum* is not a Sentence, but some Noun governed by the verb IF or GIVE. As——

#### EXAMPLE.

“ How will the weather dispose of you to-morrow ? IF fair, it will send me abroad : IF foul, it will keep me at home.”

Here we cannot say,——“ IF *that* fair, it will send me abroad : IF *that* foul, it will keep me at home.”

Because

Because in this case the Verb *IF* governs the *Noun* : and the resolved construction is —.

#### RESOLUTION.

“ GIVE fair weather, it will send me abroad :  
 “ GIVE foul weather, it will keep me at home.”

But make the *Datum* a sentence ; As, —.

“ IF it is fair weather, it will send me abroad :  
 “ IF it is foul weather, it will keep me at  
 “ home.”——

And then the *Article* *THAT* is understood, and may be inserted after *IF*. As, — “ IF *THAT*  
 “ it is fair weather, it will send me abroad : IF  
 “ *THAT* it is foul weather it will keep me at  
 “ home.”——The resolution then being ——  
 “ It is fair weather, GIVE *THAT*, it will send  
 “ me abroad : It is foul weather, GIVE *THAT*,  
 “ it will keep me at home.”

And this you will find to hold universally, not only with *IF* ; but with many other supposed *Conjunctions*, such as *unless that, though that, lest that, &c.* (which are really *Verbs*,) put in this manner before the *Article* *THAT*.

We have in English another word, which (though now rather obsolete) used frequently to supply the place of *IF*. As,

“ AN you had any eye behind you, you might  
 “ see more detraction at your heels, than fortunes before you.”

No doubt it will be asked ; in this and in all similar instances what is *AN* ?

I do not know that any person has ever attempted to explain it, except Dr. S. Johnson in his Dictionary. He says, —— “ *AN* is sometimes, in old authors, a contraction of *AND*  
 “ *IF*.”——Of which he gives a very unlucky instance

instance from Shakespeare ; where both AN and IF are used in the same line ;

“ He cannot flatter, He !

“ An honest mind and plain ; he must speak truth !

“ AN they will take it,—So. IF not, He’s plain.”

Where if AN was a contraction of AND IF ; AN and IF should rather change places.

But I can by no means agree with Johnson’s account. A part of one word only, employed to shew that another word is compounded with it, would indeed be a curious method of *contraction* : although even this account of it would serve my purpose ; but the truth will serve it better : for AN is also a *Verb*, and may very well supply the place of IF : it being nothing else but the Imperative Mood of the Anglo-saxon Verb *Ānan*, which likewise means to GIVE OR TO GRANT.

Nor does AN ever (as Johnson supposes) signify AS IF ; nor is it a contraction of them.

I know indeed that Johnson produces Addison’s authority for it.

“ My next pretty correspondent, like Shakespeare’s Lion in Pyramus and Thisbe, roars  
“ AN it were any Nightingale.”

Now if Addison had so written, I should answer roundly, that he had written false English. But he never did so write. He only quoted it in mirth. And Johnson, an Editor of Shakespeare, ought to have known and observed it. And then, instead of Addison’s or even Shakespeare’s authority from whom the expression is borrowed ; he should have quoted *Bottom’s*, the Weaver ;



Weaver : whose language corresponds with the character Shakespeare has given him\*.

“ I will aggravate my voice so (says Bottom)  
 “ that I will roar you as gently as any sucking  
 “ Dove : I will roar you AN ’twere any Nightin-  
 “ gale.”

If Johnson is satisfied with such authority as this, for the different signification and propriety of English words ; he will find enough of it amongst the clowns in all our comedies ; and Master Bottom in particular, in this very sentence, will furnish him with many new meanings. But, I believe, Johnson will not find AN used for AS IF, either seriously or clownishly, in any other part of Addison or Shakespeare, except in this speech of Bottom, and in another of Hostess Quickly.—

“ He made a finer end, and went away AN it  
 “ it had been any Christom Child.”

Now when I say that these two English words IF and AN, which have been called conditional Conjunctions, (and whose force and manner of signification, as well as of the other Conjunctions we are directed by Mr. Locke to search after in —“ the several views, postures, stands, turns, “ limitations, and exceptions, and several other “ thoughts of the mind for which we have either *none or very deficient names,*”) when I say that they are merely the original Imperatives of the verbs to GIVE or to GRANT ; I would not be understood to mean that the conditional Conjunctions of all other languages are likewise to be found, like IF and AN, in the original Imperatives of some of their own or derived Verbs meaning to GIVE. No, If

\* “ The shallow’st thickskull of that barren sort,  
 “ A crew of Patches, rude Mechanicals,  
 “ That work for bread upon Athenian Stalls.”

that

that were my opinion, it would instantly be confuted by the Conditionals of the Greek and Latin and Irish and many living languages. But I mean that those words which are called conditional Conjunctions, are to be accounted for, in ALL languages, in the *same manner* as I have accounted for IF and AN. Not indeed that they must all mean precisely, as these two do, — GIVE and GRANT; but some word equivalent. Such as, — *Be it, Suppose, Allow, Permit, Suffer, &c.*

Which meaning is to be sought for from the particular Etymology of each language; not from some unnamed and unknown — “Turns, Stands, “Postures, &c. of the mind.”

In short, to put this matter out of doubt, I mean to discard all supposed mystery, not only about these *Conditionals*, but about all those words also which Mr. Harris and others distinguish from *Prepositions*, and call *Conjunctions* of Sentences. I deny them to be a separate sort of words, or Part of Speech by themselves. For they have not a separate *manner of signification*: although they are not “*devoid of signification.*” And the particular signification of each must be sought for from amongst the other Parts of Speech, by the help of the particular etymology of each respective language. By such means alone can we clear away the obscurity and errors in which Grammarians and Philosophers have been involved by the corruption of some common words and the useful *Abbreviations of Construction*. And at the same time we shall get rid of that farrago of useless distinctions into *Conjunctive, Adjunctive, Disjunctive, Sub-disjunctive, Copulative, Continuative, Sub-continuative, Positive, Suppositive, Causal, Collective, Effective, Approbative, Discretive, Ablative, Presumptive, Abnegative, Compleitive, Preventive, Ad-*  
*versative,*

*versative, Concessive, Motive, Conduotive, &c. &c. &c.*—which explain nothing; and (as most other technical terms are abused) serve only to throw a veil over the ignorance of those who employ them.

You will easily perceive, Sir, by what I have said, that I mean flatly to contradict Mr. Harris's definition of a *Conjunction*; which, he says, is—  
*“ A Part of Speech devoid of signification itself, but  
 “ so formed as to help signification by making two or  
 “ more significant sentences to be one significant sen-  
 “ tence.”*

And I have the less scruple to do that; because Mr. Harris makes no scruple to contradict himself. For he afterwards acknowledges that *some* of them—*“ have a kind of obscure signification,  
 “ when taken alone; and that, they appear in Gram-  
 “ mar, like Zoophytes in Nature, a kind of middle  
 “ Beings of amphibious character, which, by sharing  
 “ the attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce  
 “ to link the whole together.”*

Now I suppose it is impossible to convey a *Nothing* in a more ingenious manner. How much superior is this to the oracular Saw of another learned author on language (Lord Monboddo) 'who, amongst much other intelligence of equal importance, tells us with a very solemn face, and ascribes it to Plato, that—  
*“ Every man that opines must opine something, the  
 “ subject of opinion therefore is not nothing.”\**

But Mr. Harris has the advantage of a *Similie* over this gentleman: and though *Similies* appear

\* “ Il possède l'antiquité, comme on le peut voir par les belles remarques qu'il a faites. Sans lui nous ne saurions pas que dans la ville d'Athènes les Enfants pleuroient quand on leur donnoit le fouet.—Nous devons cette découverte à sa profonde Erudition.

with most beauty and propriety in works of imagination, they are frequently found most useful to the authors of philosophical treatises: and have often helped them out at many a dead lift, by giving them an appearance of saying something, when indeed they had nothing to say. But we may depend upon it,—*Nubila mens est, hæc ubi regnant*. As a proof of which, let us only examine the present instance, and see what intelligence we can draw from Mr. Harris concerning the nature of *Conjunctions*.

First, he says (and makes it a part of their *definition*) that, they are—“*devoid of signification.*” \* —Afterwards, he allows that they have—“*a kind of signification.*” “But this kind of signification is obscure:”—*i. e.* a signification unknown: something I suppose (as Chillingworth couples them) like a *secret Tradition*, or a *silent Thunder*; for it amounts to the same thing as, a *signification* which does not *signify*: an obscure or unknown signification being no signification at all. But not contented with these inconsistencies, which to a less learned man would seem sufficient of all conscience, Mr. Harris goes farther, and adds, that they are, a—“*kind of middle Beings*”—(he must mean between *signification* and *no signification*;) “*sharing the attributes of both*,” (*i. e.* of *fig.* and *no fig.*) and—“*conduce to link them both (i. e. signification and no signification) together.*”—

It would have helped us a little, if Mr. Harris had here told us what that middle state is, between signification and no signification! what are the *attributes* of no signification! and how, sig-

\* Observe Mr. Harris defines a Word to be “*a sound significant.*” And now he defines a Conjunction to be a Word (*i. e.* a *sound significant*) *devoid of signification.*

nification and no signification can be linked together!

Now all this may, for aught I know, be —  
 “*read and admired, as long as there is any taste for*  
 “ FINE WRITING *in Britain.*” — But with such *un-*  
*learned and vulgar* Philosophers as Mr. Locke and  
 his disciples, who seek not *Taste and Elegance*,  
 but Truth and Common Sense in philosophical  
 subjects, I believe it will never pass as a “*per-*  
*fect example of Analysis,*” nor bear away the  
 Palm for “*acuteness of investigation*” and “*per-*  
*spicuity of explication*”. — For, (separated from  
 the FINE WRITING,) thus is the *Conjunction* ex-  
 plained by Mr. Harris; —

—A word *devoid of signification*, having at the  
 same time a *kind of obscure signification*; and yet  
 having neither signification nor no signification;  
 but a *middle something*, between signification and  
 no signification, *sharing the attributes* both of  
 signification and no signification; and *linking*  
 signification and no signification together. —

If others of a more elegant *Taste for Fine*  
*Writing* are able to receive either pleasure or in-  
 struction from such “*truly philosophical Lan-*  
*guage,*” I shall neither dispute with them nor  
 envy them: But can only deplore the dullness of  
 my own apprehension, who, notwithstanding the  
 great authors quoted in Mr. Harris’s Treatise,  
 and the great authors who recommend it, can-  
 not help considering this “*perfect example of*  
 “ *Analysis,*” as, — An improved compilation  
 of almost all the errors which Grammarians have  
 been accumulating from the time of Aristotle  
 down to our present days of technical and learned  
 affectation.

I can easily suppose that in this censure which I thus unreservedly cast upon Mr. Harris, (and which I do not mean to confine to his account of the Conjunctions alone, but extend to all that he has written on the subject of language) I can easily suppose that I shall be thought, by those who know not the grounds of my censure, to have spoken too sharply. They will probably say that I still carry with me my old humour in Politics, though my subject is now different; and that, according to the hackneyed accusation, I am against authority, only because authority is against me. But, if I know any thing of myself, I can with truth declare, that *Neminem libenter nominem, nisi ut laudem; sed nec peccata reprehenderem, nisi ut aliis prodessem.* And so far from spurning authority, I have always upon philosophical subjects addressed myself to an inquiry into the opinions of others with all the diffidence of conscious ignorance; and have been disposed to admit of half an argument from a great name. So that it is not my fault, if I am forced to carry instead of following the lanthorn; but at all events it is better than walking in total darkness.

And yet, though I believe I differ from all the accounts which have hitherto been given of language, I am not so much without authority as may be imagined. Mr. Harris himself, and all the Grammarians whom he has and whom he has not quoted, are my authorities. Their own doubts, their difficulties, their dissatisfaction, their contradictions, their obscurity on all these points, are my authorities against them: for their system and their difficulties vanish together. Indeed, unless I had been repeating what others  
have

have written, it is impossible I should quote any direct authorities for my own manner of explanation. But let us hear WILKINS, whose industry deserved to have been better employed, and his perseverance better rewarded with discovery; let us hear what he says.

——— “ *According to the true philosophy of Speech, I cannot conceive this kind of words*” (he speaks of Adverbs and Conjunctions) “ *to be properly a distinct Part of Speech, as they are commonly called. But untill they can be distributed into their proper places, I have so far complied with the Grammars of instituted languages, as to place them here together.*”

Mr. Locke’s dissatisfaction with all the accounts which he had seen, is too well known to need repetition.

Sanctius rescued quod particularly from the number of these mysterious Conjunctions; though he left ut amongst them.

And Servius, Scioppius, J. G. Vossius, Perrizonius, and others, have displaced and explained many other supposed Adverbs and Conjunctions.

Skinner, has accounted for it before me, and in the same manner; which, though so palpable, *Lye* confirms and compliments.

Even S. Johnson, though mistakenly, has attempted AND. And would find no difficulty with THEREFORE.

In short, there is not such a thing as a *Conjunction* in any language, which may not, by a skilful Herald, be traced home to its own family and origin; without having recourse to contradiction and mystery, with Mr. Harris: or, with Mr. Locke, cleaving open the Head of man, to

give it such a birth as Minerva's from the brain of Jupiter.

After all I do not know whether I shall be quietly permitted to call these authorities in my favour: for I must fairly acknowledge that the full stream and current sets the other way, and only some little brook or rivulet runs with me. I must confess that all the authorities which I have alledged, except Wilkins, are upon the whole against me. For, though they have explained the meaning and traced the derivation of many Adverbs and Conjunctions; yet, (except Sanctius in the particular instance of *quod*,—whose conjunctive use in Latin he too strenuously denies), they all acknowledge them still to be *Adverbs or Conjunctions*.

It is true, they distinguish them by the title of *reperita* or *usurpata*: But they at the same time acknowledge (indeed the very distinction itself is an acknowledgment) that there are others which are real, *primigenia, nativa, pura*.

But the true reason of this distinction is, because that of the origin of the greater part of them they are totally ignorant. But has any Philosopher or Grammarian ever yet told us what a *real, original, native, pure* Adverb or Conjunction, is? Or which of these Conjunctions of Sentences are so?—Whenever that is done, in any language, I may venture to promise that I will shew those likewise to be *reperitas*, and *usurpatas*, as well as the rest. I shall only add, that though *Abbreviation and Corruption are always busiest with the words which are most frequently in use*; yet the words most frequently used are least liable to be totally laid aside. And therefore they are often retained,—(I mean that branch of  
them



them which is most frequently used) when most of the other words (and even the other branches of these retained words) are, by various changes and accidents, quite lost to a language. HENCE the difficulty of accounting for them. And HENCE, (because only one branch of these *declinable* words is retained in a language) arises the notion of their being *indeclinable*; and a separate sort of words, or Part of Speech by themselves. But that they are not *indeclinable*, is sufficiently evident by what I have already said: For *My*, *An*, &c. certainly could not be called *indeclinable*, when all the other branches of those *verbs*, of which they are the regular Imperatives, were likewise in use. And that the words *If*, *An*, &c. (which still retain their original signification, and are used in the very same manner, and for the same purpose as formerly) should now be called *indeclinable*, proceeds merely from the ignorance of those who could not account for them; and who, therefore, with Mr. Harris, were driven to say that they have neither meaning (\*) nor Inflection: whilst notwithstanding they were still forced to acknowledge (either directly, or by giving them different titles of *conditional*, *adversative*, &c.) that they have a “kind of obscure meaning.”

How much more candid and ingenuous would it have been, to have owned fairly that they did not understand the nature of these *Conjunctions*; and, instead of wrapping it up in mystery, to

(\*) There is not, nor is it possible there should be, a word in any language, which has not a compleat meaning and signification, even when taken by itself. Adjectives, Prepositions, Adverbs, &c. have all compleat, separate meanings; not difficult to be discovered.

have exhorted and encouraged others to a farther search. (†)

Now, Sir, I am presumptuous enough to assert that what I have done with IF and AN, may be done universally with all the Conjunctions of all the languages in the world. I know that many persons have often been misled by a fanciful etymology ; but I assert it universally not so much from my own slender acquisition of languages, as from arguments a priori : which arguments are however confirmed to me by a successful search in many other languages besides the English, in which I have traced these supposed *unmeaning, indeclinable* Conjunctions to their source ; and should not at all fear undertaking to shew clearly and satisfactorily the origin and precise meaning of each of these pretended *unmeaning, indeclinable* Conjunctions, at least in all the dead and living languages of Europe.

But because men talk very safely of what they *may do*, and what they *might have done* ; and I cannot expect that others who have no suspicion of the thing, should come over to my opinion, unless I perform, at least as much as Wilkins (who had a suspicion of it) required before he would venture to differ from the Grammars of instituted languages ; I will distribute our English Conjunctions into their proper places. And thus wilfully impose upon myself a task which I am told “ no man however

(†) This general censure would be highly unjust, if an exception of praise was not here made for Bacon, Wilkins, Locke, and S. Johnson ; who are ingenuous on the subject.

“ learned or sagacious has yet been able to perform.” \*

Thus then ; I say that

If	Lif	Lifan	To give
An	Ān	Ānan	To grant
Unless	Onler	Onleran	To dismiss
Eke	Ēac	Ēacan	To add
Yet	Let	Letan	To get
Still	Stell	Stellan	To put
Else	Aler	Aleran	To dismiss
Tho', or	Đaf, or	Đafian, or	To allow
Though	Đapig	Đapigan	
Būt	Bot	Botan	To Boot
Būt	Be-utan	Beon-utan	To be-out
Without	pypð-utan	peopðan- utan	To be-out
And	An-að	Anan-ad	Dare Con- geriem

Left, is the Participle Lereð, of Leran, to dismiss

Since	Siððan	} is the Participle of } Seon,
Since	Sýne	
Since	Seand-es	
Since	Sið-ðe, or Sin-es	

That is the Neuter Article Đaŕ

\* “ The particles are, among all nations, applied with so great latitude, that they are not easily reducible under any regular scheme of explication : this difficulty is not less, nor perhaps greater, in English than in other languages. I have laboured them with diligence, I hope with success : such at least as can be expected in a task, which no man, however

learned or sagacious has yet been able to perform.”

Preface to S. Johnson's Dictionary.

These

These I apprehend are the only Conjunctions in our language which can cause any difficulty; and it would be impertinent in me to explain such as, *Be-it, Albeit, Notwithstanding, Nevertheless, Set,\* Save, Except, Out-cept,† Out-take,‡ to wit, Because, &c.* which are evident at first sight.

I hope it will be acknowledged that this is coming to the point; and is fairer than shuffling them over as all Philosophers and Grammarians have hitherto done; or than repeating after others, that they are not themselves any part of languages, but only such *Accessaries*, as *Salt* is to *Meat*, or *Water* to *Bread*; or that they are the mere *Edging*, or *Sauce* of language; or that they are like the *Handles* to *Cups*, or the *Plumes* to *Helmets*, or the *Binding* to *Books*, or *Harness* for *Horses*; or that they are *Pegs*; and *Nails*, and *Nerves*, and *Joints*, and *Ligaments*, and *Lime* and *Mortar*, and so forth.

In which kind of pretty Similies Philosophers and Grammarians seem to have vied with one another; and have often endeavoured to amuse their readers and cover their own igno-

\* “ *Set* this my work full febill be of rent. G. Douglas.

† “ I’d play hun ’gaine a knight, or a good squire, or  
“ gentleman of any other countie I’ the kingdome.”—*Outcept*  
“ Kent: for there they landed all gentlemen.”

B. Johnson. Tale of a Tub.

‡ “ And also I resygne al my knyghtly dygnitie, magesty  
“ and crowne, wyth all the lordes hyppes, powre, and pry-  
“ vileges to the foresayd kingely dygnitie and crown belong-  
“ ing, and al other lordshippes and possesyons to me in any  
“ maner of wyse pertaynyng, what name and condicion thei  
“ be of, *out-take* the landes and possessions for me and mine  
“ obyte purchafed and broughte.”

Instrument of resignation of K. Richard II.  
in Fabian’s Chronicle.

rance,

rance, by very learnedly disputing the propriety of the Similie, instead of explaining the nature of the Conjunction.

I must acknowledge that I have not any authorities for the derivations which I have given of these words; and that all former etymologists are against me. But I am persuaded that all future etymologists (and perhaps some Philosophers) will acknowledge their obligation to me: for these troublesome Conjunctions, which have hitherto caused them so much mistaken and unsatisfactory labour, shall save them many an error and many a weary step in future.

They shall no more expose themselves by unnatural forced conceits to derive the English and all other languages from the Greek or the Hebrew, or some imaginary primæval tongue. The Conjunctions of *every* language shall teach them whither to direct and where to stop their inquiries: for wherever the evident meaning and origin of the Conjunctions of any language can be found, there is the certain source of the whole†.

But, I beg pardon, this is digressing from my present purpose. I have nothing to do with the learning of mere curiosity; nor must (at this time) be any farther concerned with etymology, and the false philosophy received concerning language and the human understanding than as it is connected with the point with which I began.

If you please therefore, and if your patience is not exhausted, we will return to the Conjunctions I have derived: and if you think it worth the while we will examine the conjectures

† This is to be understood with certain limitations not necessary to be now mentioned.

of other persons about them, and see whether I have not something better than their authority in my favour.

# IF AN.

IF and AN may be used mutually and indifferently to supply each other's place.

Besides having Skinner's authority for IF, I suppose that the meaning and derivation of this principal supporter of the *Tripod of Truth*,\* are so very clear and simple and universally allowed, as to need no farther discourse about it.

GIF is to be found not only, as Skinner says, in Lincolnshire; but in all our old writers. G. Douglas almost always uses *Gif*; once or twice only he has used IF; and once he uses GEWE for *Gif*. Chaucer commonly uses IF; but sometimes YEVE,§ YEF, and YF. And it is to be observed that in Chaucer, and other old writers, the Verb to *Give* suffers the same variations in the manner of writing it, however used, whether *conjunctively* or otherwise.

“ Well ought a Priest ensample for to *Yeve*.”

Prol. to Cant. Tales.

“ Lo here the letters selid of this thing,

“ That I mote bere in all the haste I may ;

“ *Yeve* ye well ought unto your sonne the king,

“ I am your servant both by night and day.”

Man of Lawes Tale.

“ This gode ensample to his shepe he *yasse*.”

Prologue to Cant. Tales.

\* See Plutarch, Why E 1 was engraved upon the Gates of the Temple of Apollo.

§ YEVE was commonly used in England instead of *Give*, even so low down as in the sixteenth Century. See Henry VIIIth's will.

YEF is also used as well for the common imperative as for what we call the conjunction.

- “ Your vertue is so grete in heven above,  
 “ That IF the list I shall well have my love.  
 “ Thy temple shall I worship evir mo,  
 “ And on thine aulter, where I ryde or go,  
 “ I woll don sacrificie, and firis bete ;  
 “ And YEF ye woll nat so my lady swete,  
 “ Then pray I you tomorrow with a spere  
 “ That Arcite do me through the herte bere :  
 “ Then reke I not, whan I have lost my life,  
 “ Though Arcite winnin her to his wife.  
 “ This is th’ effect and ende of my prayere ;  
 “ YEF me my lady, blisful lady dere.”

Chaucer, Knight’s Tale.

GIN† is often used in our northern counties and by the Scotch, as we use IF or AN : which they do with equal propriety and as little corruption : for *Gin* is no other than the participle *Given*, *Gi’en*, *Gi’n*. (As they also use *Gie* for *Give*, and *Gien* for *Given*, when they are not used conjunctively). And *hoc dato* is of equal conjunctive value in a sentence with *da hoc*.

Even our Londoners often pronounce *Give* and *Given* in the same manner ;

As,—“ *Gi*’ me your hand”

“ I have *Gin* it him well.”

I do not know that AN has been attempted by any one, except S. Johnson : and from the judicious distinction he has made between Junius and

† “ *Gin*, *Gif*, in the old Saxon is *Gif*, from whence the word “*If* is made per aphæresin literæ G. *Gif* from the verb *Gifan*, “dare ; and is as much as *Dato*.”

Ray’s North Country Words.

Skinner,

Skinner, I am persuaded that he will himself be the first person to relinquish his own conjecture.

### UNLESS.

Skinner says,—"UNLESS, nisi, præter, præterquam, *q. d. one-les* (i. e.) *uno dempto seu excepto*: vel potius ab *onlesan*, dimittere, libere, *q. d. Hoc dimisso*."

It is extraordinary, after his judicious derivation of IF, that Skinner should be at a loss about that of UNLESS: especially as he had it in a manner before him: for *Onles*, *dimitte*, was surely more obvious and immediate than *Onlesed*, *dimisso*. As for—*One-les*, i. e. *Uno dempto seu excepto*, it is too poor to deserve notice.

So low down as in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, this conjunction was sometimes written *oneles*: for so (amongst others) Robert Horne, Bishop of Winchester, writes it in his—"An sweare to Fekenham touchinge the othe of the supremacy."—

"I coulde not choose, *oneles* I woulde shewe myselfe overmuch unkinde unto my native countrey, but take penne in hande, and shape him a ful and plaine answeare, without any curiositie."

### PREFACE.

And this way of spelling it, which should rather have directed Skinner to its true Etymology, might perhaps contribute to mislead him to the childish conjecture of "*one-les*, *Uno dempto*."—But in other places it is written purely ONLES.

Thus, in the same book,

"The election of the Pope made by the Clergie and People in those daies, was but a vaine



“ vaine thing, ONLES the Emperour or his Lieutenant had confirmed the same.” Fol. 48.

“ The Pope would not consecrate the elect Bishop, ONLES he had first licence therto of the Emperour.” Fol. 63.

“ No prince, no not the Emperour himselfe should be present in the Councell with the Cleargie, ONLES it were when the principall pointes of faith were treated of.” Fol. 67.

“ He sweareth the Romaines, that they shall never after be present at the election of any Pope, ONLES they be compelled thereunto by the Emperour.” Fol. 71.

“ Who maketh no mencion of any priest there present, as you untruely report, ONLES ye will thinke he meant the order, whan he named the faction of the Pharisees.” Fol. III.

It is likewise sometimes written—ONLESSE and ONELESSE.

“ So that none should be consecrate, ONLESSE he were commended and investured Bishop of the kinge.” Fol. 59.

“ And further to commaunde the newe electe Pope to forsake that dignitie unlawfully come by, ONLESSE they woulde make a reasonable satisfaction.” Fol. 73.

“ That the Pope might sende into his dominions no Legate, ONLESSE the Kinge should sende for him.” Fol. 76.

“ What man, ONLESSE he be not well in his wittes, will say that &c.” Fol. 95.

“ To exercise this kinde of jurisdiction, neither kinges nor civil magistrates may take uppon him, ONLESSE he be lawfully called thereunto.” Fol. 105.

“ That

" That from hencefoorth none should be Pope,  
" ONELESSE he were created by the consent of the  
" Emperour." Fol. 75.

" Ye cannot finde so muche as the bare title  
" of one of them, ONELESSE it be of a Bishoppe."  
Fol. 113.

In the same manner, Gardiner, Bishop of  
Winchester, writes it in his " Declaration against  
" Joye."\*

" No man commeth to me, ONLESSE my fa-  
" ther draweth hym." Fol. 29.

" Can any man further reply to this carpenter,  
" ONLES a man wolde saye, that the carpenter  
" was also after, the these hymselfe." F. 42.

" For ye fondely improve a conclusion which  
" myght stande and be true, ONLESSE in teach-  
" ing ye wyl so handel the matter, as &c."  
F. 54.

" We cannot love God, ONLES he prepareth  
" our harte, and geve us that grace: no more  
" can we beleve God, ONLESSE he giveth us the  
" gift of belefe." Fol. 64.

" In every kynde the female is commenly  
" barren, ONLESSE it conceyveth of the male;  
" so is concupyscence barren and voyde of synne,  
" ONLESSE it conceive of man the agreymente  
" of his free wyll." F. 66.

" We may not properly saye we apprehend  
" justification by fayth, ONLESSE we wolde call  
" the promise of God, &c." F. 68.

" Such other pevishe words as men be encom-  
" bred to heare, ONLES they wolde make Goddes

\* In the same manner Barnes (on the occasion of whose death  
Gardiner wrote this declaration) writes it in his *supplication to*  
*K. Henry VIII.*

" I shall come to the Councell, when soever I bee called,  
ONLES I be lawfully let." p. 195.

" worde,

“ worde, the matter of the Devylles strife.”  
Fol. 88.

“ Who can wake out of synne; without  
“ God call him; and ONLESSE God hath given  
“ eares to heare this voyce of God. How is  
“ any man, beyng lame with synne, able to take  
“ up his couche and walke, ONLESSE God sayeth,  
“ &c. F. 95\*.”

I have here given you all the instances where this conjunction is used in these two small tracts I have quoted, which I suppose are something more than sufficient for my purpose; unless you had as much leisure to read as I have to write.

I do not remember to have ever met with *Onler* used in the Anglo-Saxon as we use *Unless*; (though I have no doubt that it was so used in discourse) but, instead of it, they frequently employ *nȳmðe* or *nemðe*: (which is evidently the Imperative *nȳm* or *nem*, of *nyman* or *neman*, to which is subjoined *ðe*. (*i. e. that.*) And—*nȳmðe*, *Take away that*,—may very well supply the place of—*Onler* (*ðe* expressed or understood) *Dismiss that*.

\* So in the Trial of Sir John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham, 1413.

“ It was not possible for them to make whole Christes Cote  
“ without seme ONLESSE certeyn great men were brought out  
“ of the way.”

So, in the Whetstone of Witte.

“ I see moure menne to acknowledge the benefit of nom-  
“ ber, then I can espie willyng to studie, to attain the bene-  
“ fites of it. Many praise it, but fewe dooc greatly practise it,  
“ ONLESSE it bee for the vulgare practice concernyng mer-  
“ chaundes trade.”

The Whetstone of Witte, by Robert Recorde *Physician*. (If himself say true, the first author concerning Arithmetic in English) 1557.

“ The first venturer in these darke matters.” PREFACE.

“ Yet is it not accepted as a *like flatte*, ONLES it bee referred  
“ to some other *square number*.” Whetstone of Witte, F. 54.

LES,\* the Imperative of Leran, (which has the same meaning as Onleran) is likewise used sometimes by old writers instead of *Unless*. As,

“ And thus I am confrenit, als nere as I may,  
 “ To hald his verse, and go nane uthir way.  
 “ LES sum historie, subtell worde, or ryme,  
 “ Causis me mak degressioun sum tyme.”

G. Douglas. *Preface.*

You will please to observe that all the languages which have a correspondent Conjunction to *Unless*, as well as the manner in which its place is supplied by the languages which have not a correspondent Conjunction to it, all strongly justify my derivation.

Though it certainly is not worth the while, I am tempted here to observe the gross mistake Mr. Harris has made in the *force* of this word, which he calls an “*Adequate Preventive*.” His example is,—“Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved.”—“That is, (says Mr. Harris) “This alone is sufficient to preserve it.”—According to the Oracle, so indeed it might be; but the word UNLESS has no such force.

Let us try another instance.

“England will be enslaved, UNLESS the House of Commons continue a part of the Legislature.”

Now I ask,—Is this alone sufficient to preserve it? We who live in these times know but too well that this very House may be made the In-

\* It is the same imperative at the end of those words which are called adjectives, such as *hopeless*, *motionless*, &c. i. e. *dismiss hope*, *dismiss motion*, &c.

strument of a Tyranny as odious and (*perhaps*) more lasting than that of the Stuarts. I am afraid Mr. Harris's *adequate Preventive*, UNLESS, will not save us. For though it is most cruel and unnatural, yet we know by woful experience that the *Kid* may be *scethed in the Mother's milk*, which Providence appointed for its nourishment; and the Liberties of this Country be destroyed by that very part of the Legislature which was most especially appointed for their security.

## E K E.

Junius says,—“EAK, *etiam* Goth. **ANK** A. S. “Eac. Al. *auch*. D. *og*. B. *ook*. Viderentur “esse ex inverſo *Kal*, ſed rectius petas ex proxime “ſequenti **ANKAN** (“In. *avξα*) A. S. Eacan. Ecan. “ican. Al. *auchon*. D. *oge*. B. *oecken*. Eacan “vero, vel *auchon*, ſunt ab *avξειν* vel *αεξειν*, addere, “adjicere, augere.”

Skinner ſays,—“EKE, ab A. S. Eac, Geac. “Belg. *Oock*. Teut. *Auch*. Fr. Th. *Ouch*. D. “*Oc*. *etiam*.”

Skinner then proceeds to the verb,

“To EKE, ab A. S. Eacan. Geican. Iecan, au- “gere, adjicere. Fr. Jun. ſuo more, deſlectit a “Gr. *avξειν*. Mallem ab Eac. iterum quod vide: “Quod enim augetur ſecundum partes ſuas quaſi “iteratur et de novo fit.”

In this place Skinner does not ſeem to enjoy his uſual ſuperiority of judgment over Junius: And it is very ſtrange that he ſhould chuſe here to derive the verb Eacan from the conjunction Eac, (that is, from its own Imperative) rather than the conjunction (that is, the Imperative) from the verb. His judgment was more awake when he derived IF or CIF from Epan; and not Epan

from *Eup*: which yet, according to his present method, he should have done.

## YET STILL.

I put the conjunctions *YET* and *STILL* here together; because (like *If* and *And*) they may be used mutually for each other without any alteration in the meaning of the sentences: a circumstance which (though not so obviously as in these instances) happens likewise to some other of the conjunctions; and which is not unworthy of consideration.

According to my derivation of them both, this mutual interchange will not seem at all extraordinary: For *YET* (which is nothing but the Imperative, *ȝet* or *ȝýt*, of *ȝetan* or *ȝýtan*, obtinere), and *STILL* (which is only the Imperative *Stell* or *šteall*, of *stellan* or *šteallian*, ponere) may very well supply each other's place, and be indifferently used for the same purpose.

But I will repeat to you the derivations which others have given, and leave you to determine between us.

Mer. Casaubon says—"ETI, *adhuc*, *YET*." Junius says,—"*YET*, *adhuc*, *A S.* *ȝýt*. "Cymræis "*etwa*, *etto* significat *adhuc*, *etiam*, *iterum*: ex "*et*, vel *adhuc*."

Skinner says,——"*YET* ab *A S.* *ȝet*, *ȝeta*, "*adhuc*, *modo*. Teut. *Jetzt*, *jam*, *mox*."

Skinner says,——"*STILL*, *assidue*, *indefinenter*, *incessanter*, nescio an ab *A S.* "*Till*, *addito tantum* *fibilo*: vel a nostro, et credo *etiam*, *A S.* "*A s.* *ut*, *sicut*, *licet* apud Somnerum non occurrat, et eodem *Til*, usque. *q. d.* *Usque*, *eodem modo*."

ELSE.

This word ELSE, formerly written *Alles*, *Alys*, *Alyse*, *Elles*, *Ellus*, *Ellis*, *Els*, and now *Else*; is, as I have said, no other than *Āler* or *Ālyr*, the Imperative of *Āleran* or *Ālyran*, dimittere.

Mr. Warton, in his history of English Poetry, Vol. I. (without any authority and in spite of the context, which evidently demands ELSE and will not admit of ALSO) has explained ALLES in the following passage by ALSO.

“ The Soudan ther he fatte in halle ;  
 “ He sent his messagers fatte with alle,  
     “ To hire fader the Kyng.  
 “ And fayde, how so hit ever bi falle,  
 “ That mayde he wolde clothe in palle  
     “ And spoufen hire with his ryng.  
 “ And ALLES I swere withouten sayle  
 “ I chull hire winnen in plepe battayle  
     “ With mony an heih Lordyng, &c.”

The meaning of which is evidently,—“ Give me your daughter, ELSE I will take her by force.”

It would have been nonsense to say,—“ Give me your daughter, ALSO I will take her by force.”

I quote this passage, not for the sake of censuring Mr. Warton, but to give you one of the most recent instances, as I suppose, of ALLES used for ELSE in English.

Junius says,—“ ELSE, aliter, alias, alioqui. *A S. Eller. Al. Alles. D. Ellers.*”

Skinner says,—“ ELSE ab *A S. Eller*, alias, aliquin. Minshew & Dr. Th. H. putant esse contractum a Lat. *alias*, vel Gr. *αλλως*; nec sine “ verisimilitudine.”

S. Johnson says,—"ELSE, Pronoun," (eller Saxon) other; one besides, it is "*applied both to persons and things.*" He says again—ELSE, Adverb, "1. otherwise. 2. Besides; *except that mentioned.*"

## T H O U G H.

THO' or THOUGH (or, as our Country-folks more purely pronounce it, THAF, THAUF, and THOF; and the Scotch who retain in their pronunciation the guttural termination) is the Imperative Ðaf or Ðafig of the verb Ðafian or Ðafigan,\* concedere, permittere, assentire, consentire. And Ðafig becomes *Thoug* and *Though* (and *Thock*, as G. Douglas and other Scotch authors write it) by a transition of the same sort, and at least as easy, as that of Hawk from hapuc.

I reckon it not a small confirmation of this etymology, that antiently they often used *Algise*, *Algyff*, *Allgyf*, and *Algive*, instead of ALTHOUGH. As,

"With hevye chere, with dolorous hart and mynd,  
 "Eche man may sorrow in his inward thought  
 "Thys Lords death, whose pere is hard to fynd  
 "ALLGYF Englonde and Fraunce were therow faught."

SKELTON.

Skinner says,—"THOUGH, ab *A S.* Deah. "*Belg. Doch. Belg. and Teut. Doch,* tamen, "*etfi, quamvis.*"

\* It is remarkable that as there was originally two ways of writing the verb with the aspirate G or without it; so there still continue the two same different ways of writing the remaining part of this same verb *Tho*, or *Though*, with the aspirate G or without it.

Though



Though this word is called a Conjunctive of sentences, it is constantly used (especially by children, and in low discourse) not only between, but at the end of sentences. As,

“ PRO. Why do you maintain your Poet’s quarrel so with velvet and good clothes? We have seen him in indifferent good clothes e’re now himself.”

“ BOY. And may again. But his clothes shall never be the best thing about him, THOUGH. He will have somewhat beside, either of humane letters or severe honesty, shall speak him a Man, though he went naked.

What sentences are here connected by the prior THOUGH?

### B U T.

It was this word, BUT, which Mr. Locke had chiefly in view, when he spoke of Conjunctions as marking some “ Stands, Turns, Limitations, and Exceptions of the mind.” And it was the corrupt use of this *One* word (BUT) in modern English, for *Two* words (BOT and BUT) originally (in the Anglo-saxon very different in signification, though (by repeated abbreviation and corruption) approaching in sound, which chiefly misled him.

“ BUT (says Mr. Locke) is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a *discretive* Conjunction, and that it answers SED in Latin, or MAIS in French,\*

\* It does not answer to *sed* in Latin, or *Mais* in French; except only when it is used for Bot. Nor will any *one* word in any language answer to our English But: because a similar corruption in the same instance has not happened in any other language.

“ thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But  
 “ it seems to me to intimate *several Relations*  
 “ *the mind gives* to the several propositions or  
 “ parts of them, which it joins by this Mono-  
 “ syllable.

“ *First*,—— “ BUT to say no more :”

“ Here it intimates a stop of the mind, in  
 “ the course it was going, before it came to  
 “ the end of it.

*Secondly*,—— “ *I saw* BUT *two plants* :

“ Here it shews, that the mind limits the  
 “ sense to what is expressed, with a negation of  
 “ all other.”

*Thirdly*,—— “ *You pray* ; BUT *it is not that God*  
*would bring you to the true religion* :

*Fourthly*,—— “ BUT *that he would confirm you*  
 “ *in your own*.”

“ The first of these BUTS intimates a sup-  
 “ position in the mind of something otherwise  
 “ than it should be : the latter shews, that the  
 “ mind makes a direct opposition between that  
 “ and what goes before it.”

*Fifthly*,—— “ *All Animals have sense*, BUT *a*  
 “ *dog is an Animal*.”——

“ Here it signifies little more, but that the  
 “ latter proposition is joined to the former, as  
 “ the Minor of a Syllogism.”

“ To these, I doubt not, might be added a  
 “ great many other significations of this Par-  
 “ ticle, *If it were my business to examine it in*  
 “ *its full latitude*, and consider it in all the  
 “ places it is to be found ; which if one should  
 “ do, I doubt whether in all those manners it  
 “ is made use of, it would deserve the title of  
 “ DISCRETIVE which Grammarians give to it.

“ But

“ But *I intend not \* here a full explication of this sort of signs.* The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of *several Actions of our minds* in discoursing, which it has found *a way* to intimate to others by *these Particles*, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.”

Now all these difficulties are very easily to be removed without any effort of the understanding: and for that very reason I do not much wonder that Mr. Locke missed the explanation: For he dug too deep for it. But that the Etymologists (who only just turn up the surface) should miss it, does indeed astonish me. It seems to me impossible that any man who reads only the most common of our old English authors should fail to observe it.

Gawin Douglas, notwithstanding he frequently confounds the two words and uses them improperly, does yet (without being himself aware of the distinction, and from the mere force of customary speech) abound with so many instances and so contrasted, as to awaken, one should think, the most inattentive reader.

† “ *Essentiam finemque conjunctionum fatis aptè explicatum puto: nunc earum originem materiamque videamus. Neque vero Sigillatim percurrere omnes in Animo est.*”

J. C. SCALIGER.

The constant excuse of them all, whether Grammatists, Grammarians or Philosophers; though they dare not hazard the assertion, yet they would all have us understand that they can do it; but *non in animo est.* And it has never been done.

“ BOT thy werke shall endure in laude and glorie,  
 “ BUT spot or falt condigne eterne memorie.

Preface.

“ BOT gif this ilk statew standis here wrocht,  
 “ War with zour handis into the cietic brocht,  
 “ Than schew he that the peopil of Asia  
 “ BUT ony obtakill in fell battel fuld ga.

Book 2.

“ This chance is not BUT Goddis willis went,  
 “ Nor is it not leful thyng, quod sche,  
 “ Fra hyne Creusa thou turs away with the ;  
 “ Nor the hie Governoure of the hevin above is  
 “ Will suffer it so to be, BOT the behuff is  
 “ From hens to wend full fer into exile,  
 “ And over the braid sey sayl furth mony a myle,  
 “ Or thou cum to the land Hisperia,  
 “ Quhare with soft courfis Tybris of Lidia  
 “ Rynnys throw the riche feildis of pepill stout ;  
 “ Thare is gret substance ordenit the BUT dout.

Book 2.

——“ BOT gif the Fatis, BUT pleid,  
 “ At my plesure suffer it me life to leid.

Book 4.

“ BOT sen Apollo clepit Gryneus,  
 “ Grete Italie to seik commandis us,  
 “ To Italie eik Oraclis of Licia  
 “ Admonist us BUT mare delay to ga.

Book 4.

“ Thou wyth thir harmes overchargit me also,  
 “ Quhen I fell fyrst into this rage, quod sche,  
 “ BOT so to do my teris constrenyt the.  
 “ Was it not lefull, alace, BUT company,  
 “ To me BUT cryme allane in chalmer to ly.

Book 4.

“ The

- “ The tothir answered, nouthir for drede nor boist,  
 “ The luf of wourschip nor honoure went away is,  
 “ BOT certainly the dasit blude now on dayis  
 “ Wax is dolf and dull throw myne unweildy age,  
 “ The cald body has mynyft my curage :  
 “ BOT war I now as umquhile it has bene,  
 “ Zing as zone wantoun woistare so strang thay wene,  
 “ Ze had I now sic zoutheid, traiftis me,  
 “ BUT ony price I fuld all reddy be.

Book 5.

- “ The prince Eneas than feand this dout,  
 “ No langar suffir wald sic wraith procede,  
 “ Nor feirs Entellus mude thus rage and sprede ;  
 “ BOT of the bargane maid end, BUT delay.

Book 5.

- “ In nowmer war thay BUT ane few menze,  
 “ BOT thay war quyk, and valzeant in melle.

Book 5.

- “ Blyn not, blyn not, thou grete Troian Enee,  
 “ Of thy bedis nor prayeris, quod sche ;  
 “ For BOT thou do, thir grete durris, BUT dred,  
 “ And grisslie zettis fall never warp on bred.

Book 6.

- “ How grete apperance is in him, BUT dout,  
 “ Till be of proues, and ane vailzeant knycht :  
 “ BOT ane blak fop of mytt als dirk as nycht  
 “ Wyth drery schaddow bylappis his hede.

Book 6.

- “ BOT sen that Virgil standis BUT compare.

Prol. to Book 9.

- “ Quhiddir gif the Goddis, or sum spretis silly  
 “ Movis in our myndis this ardent thochtful fire,  
 “ Or gif that every mannis schrewit desyre  
 “ Be as his God and Genius in that place,  
 “ I wat never how it standis, BOT this lang space  
 “ My mynd movis to me, here as I stand,  
 “ Batel or sum grete thyng to tak on hand :

“ I knaw not to quhat purpos it is drest,  
 “ Bot be na way may I tak eis nor rest.  
 “ Behaldis thou not so surelie BUT affray  
 “ Zone Rutulianis haldis thaym glaid and gay?  
 Book 9.

“ Bot lo, as thay thus wounderit in effray,  
 “ This ilk Nifus, wourthin proude and gay,  
 “ And baldare of his chance fa with him gone,  
 “ Ane uthir takill affayit he anone :  
 “ And with ane sound smate Tagus BUT remede.  
 Book 9.

—“ Bot the tothir BUT fere,  
 “ Bure at him mychtely wyth ane lang spere.  
 Book 10.

“ Bot the Troiane Baroun unabastilie  
 “ Na wourdis preifis to render him agane ;  
 “ Bot at his fa let fle ane dart or flane  
 “ That hit Lucagus, quilk fra he felt the dynt,  
 “ The schaft hinging into his scheild, BUT stynt,  
 “ Bad drive his hors and chare al fordwert streicht.  
 Book 10.

“ Bot quhat awalis bargane or strang melle  
 “ Syne zeild the to thy fa, BUT ony quhy.  
 Prol. to Book 11.

“ Than of his speich so wounderit war thay  
 “ Kepit thare filence, and wist not what to fay,  
 “ Bot athir towart uthir turnis BUT mare,  
 “ And can behald his fallow in ane stare.  
 Book 11.

“ Bot now I se that zoung man haist BUT fale,  
 “ To mache in feild wyth fatis inequale.  
 Book 12.

“ Quhare sone foregadderit all the Troyane Army  
 “ And thyck about hym flokkand can BUT baid,  
 “ Bot nowthir scheild nor wappinis down thay laid.”  
 Book 12.

The Glossarist of Douglas contents himself with explaining BOT by BUT.

The Glossarist to Urry's Edition of Chaucer, says,—BOT for BUT is “a form of speech *frequently* used in Chaucer to denote the greater “certainty of a thing.”—This is a most inexcusable assertion: for, I believe, the place cited in the Glossary is the only instance (in this edition of Chaucer) where BOT is used; and there is not the smallest shadow of reason for forming even a conjecture in favour of this unsatisfactory assertion: unsatisfactory, even if the fact had been so; because it contains no explanation: for why should BOT denote greater certainty?

And here it may be proper to observe that Gawin Douglas's language (where BOT is very frequently found) though written about a century after, must yet be esteemed more antient than Chaucer's: Even as at this day the present English speech in Scotland is, in many respects, more antient than that spoken in England so far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth\*. So Mer. Casaubon, (de vet. ling. Ang.) says of his time,—“*Scotica lingua Anglicâ hodiernâ purior.*”—Where, by *purior*, he means nearer to the Anglo-Saxon.

So G. Hickes, in his Anglo-Saxon Grammar, (Chap 3.) says,—“*Scoti in multis Saxonizantes.*”

But, to return to Mr. Locke, whom (as B. Johnson says of Shakespeare) “I reverence on this side of idolatry; In the *five* instances which he has given for *five* different meanings of the

\* This will not seem at all extraordinary if you reason directly contrary to Lord Monboddo on this subject; by doing which you will generally be right as well in this as in almost every thing else which he has advanced.

word BUT, there are indeed only two different meanings\*: nor could he, as he imagined he could, have added any other significations of this Particle, but what are to be found in BOT and BUT as I have explained them†.

BUT, in the *first*, *third*, *fourth*, and *fifth* instances, is corruptly put for BOT, the Imperative of BOTAN:

In the second instance only it is put for BUTE, or BUTAN, or Be--utan†.

“ \* You must answer, that she was brought very near the fire, and as good as thrown in ; or else that she was provoked to it by a divine inspiration. BUT, BUT that another divine inspiration moved the beholders to believe that she did therein a noble act, this act of hers might have been calumniated, &c.”

Donne's *Biathanatos*.

Part 2. Distinct. 5. Sect. 8.

In the above passage, which is exceedingly awkward, BUT is used in both its meanings close to each other: and the impropriety of the corruption appears therefore in its most offensive point of view. A careful author would avoid this, by placing these two BUTS at a distance from each other in the sentence, or by changing one of them for some other equivalent word. Whereas had the corruption not taken place, he might without any inelegance (in this respect) have kept the construction of the sentence as it now stands: for nothing would have offended us, had it run thus,—“ *Bot, butan* that another divine inspiration moved the beholders, &c.”

† S. Johnson, in his dictionary, has numbered up *Eighteen* different significations (as he imagines) of BUT: which however are all reducible to *Bot* and *Be-utan*.

† “ I saw BUT two plants.”

*Not* or *Ne* is here left out and understood, which used formerly to be always inserted, as it frequently is still.

So Chaucer—“ I ne usurpe not to have founden this werke of my labour or of myne Engin. I n' ame *But* a leude compilatour of the labour of old Astrologiens, and have it translated in myn Englishe. And with this Swerde shall I sleene envy.”

Introduction to Conclusions of the Astrolabie.

We should now say—“ I am *but* a leude compilatour, &c.”

In



In the *first* instance,—“*To say no more,*” is a mere parenthesis: and Mr. Locke has unwarily attributed to BUT, the meaning contained in the parenthesis: for suppose the instance had been this,—“*BUT, to proceed.*”—Or this,—“*BUT, to go fairly thro’ this matter.*”—Or this,—“*BUT, not to stop.*”—

Does BUT in any of these instances, intimate a stop of the mind in the course it was going? The truth is that BUT itself is the farthest of any word in the language from “*intimating a stop.*” On the contrary it always intimates something MORE†, something to follow: (as indeed it does in this very instance of Mr. Locke’s; though we know not what that something is, because the sentence is not compleated.) And therefore whenever any one in discourse finishes his words with BUT, the question always follows—BUT *what?*—

So that Shakespeare speaks most truly as well as poetically, when he gives an account of BUT, very different from this of Mr. Locke.

† In the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and several other dead and living languages, the very word MORE is used for this Conjunction BUT.

The French language anciently used *Mais* not only as they now do for the Conjunction *Mais*; but also as they now use *plus*.

Y puis je *Mais*?

Je n’en puis *Mais*.

Are still in use among the vulgar people; in both which expressions it means *more*. So Henri Estienne uses it;

“*Sont si bien accoustumez à ceste syncope, ou plustost apocope, qu’ils en font quelquesfois autant aux dissyllables, qui n’en peuvent mais.*”

H. E. de la precellence du langage François, page 18.

“*Mais vient de magis (j’enten mais pour d’avantage).*”

H. E. de la precellence du langage François, page 131.

*Mess.*

“ *Mess.* Madam, he’s well.

“ *Cleo.* Well said.

“ *Mess.* And friends with Cæsar.

“ *Cleo.* Thou’rt an honest man.

“ *Mess.* Cæsar and he are greater friends than ever.

“ *Cleo.* Make thee a fortune from me.

“ *Mess.* BUT—YET—Madam,—

“ *Cleo.* I do not like BUT—YET.—It does allay

“ The good precedent. Fie upon BUT—YET.—

“ BUT—YET—is as a Jaylour, to bring forth

“ Some monstrous Malefactor.”

Anthony and Cleopatra, Act 2. Sc. 5.

Where you may observe that YET (though used elegantly here, to mark more strongly the hesitation of the speaker) is merely superfluous to the sense; as it is always when used after BOT: for either BOT or YET alone (and especially BOT) has the very same effect, and will always be found to *Allay* equally the *Good*, or the *Bad*<sup>\*</sup>, precedent; by something MORE† that follows. For BOTAN means

\* “ *Speed.* Item, She hath more hairs than wit, and more faults than hairs, BUT more wealth than faults.

“ *Laun.* Stop there. She was mine, and not mine, twice or thrice in that Article. Rehearse that once more.

“ *Speed.* Item, She hath more hair than wit.

“ *Laun.* What’s next?

“ *Speed.* And more faults than hairs.

“ *Laun.* That’s monstrous! Oh that that were out!

“ *Speed.* BUT more wealth than faults.

“ *Laun.* Why that word makes the faults gracious.”

Here the word BUT allays the *Bad* precedent; for which, without any shifting of its own intrinsic signification, it is as well qualified as to allay the *Good*.

† So Tasso,—“ *Am.* Oh, che mi dici?

“ *Silvia* m’attende, ignuda, e sola? *Tir.* Sola,

“ *Se non* quanto v’è *Dafne*, ch’è per noi.

“ *Am.*

means—to *Boot*,\* i. e. to superadd,§ to supply, to substitute, to compensate with, to remedy with, to make amends with, to add something MORE in order to make up a deficiency in something else.

So likewise in the *third* and *fourth* instances, (taken from Chillingworth)†. Mr. Locke has

D

attribu-

“ *Am.* Ignuda ella m’ aspetta? *Tir.* Ignuda: m’—

“ *Am.* Oimè, che m’ a? Tu taci; tu m’ uccidi.”

Aminta. Att. 2. Sce. 3.

Where the difference of the construction in the English and the Italian is worth observing; and the reason evident, why in the question consequent to the Conjunction, *what* is placed after the one, but before the other.

<i>Boot what?</i>	}		}	<i>What more?</i>
<i>But what?</i>	}		}	<i>Che Ma?</i>

\* S. Johnson, and others, have mistaken the expression—*To Boot*—(which still remains in our language) for a Substantive; which is indeed the infinitive of the same verb, of which the Conjunction is the Imperative.

§ “ Perhaps it may be thought improper for me to address you on this subject. BUT a moment, my Lords, and it will evidently appear that you are equally blameable for an omission of duty here also.”

This may be supposed an abbreviation of construction, for “ But indulge me with a moment, my Lords, and it will, &c.” but there is no occasion for such a supposition.

† Knott had said,—“ How can it be in us a fundamental error to say, the Scripture alone is not Judge of controversies, seeing (notwithstanding this our belief) we use for interpreting of Scripture, all the means which they prescribe; as *Prayer*, conferring of places, consulting the originals, &c.”

To which Chillingworth replies,

“ You *Pray*, BUT it is not that God would bring you to the true religion, BUT that he would confirm you in your own. You confer places, BUT it is that you may confirm, or colour over with plausible disguises your erroneous doctrines; not that you may judge of them, and forsake them, if there be reason for it. You consult the originals, BUT you regard them not when they make against your doctrine or translation.”

attributed to BUT, a meaning which can only be collected from the words which follow it.

But Mr. Locke says,—“ If it were his business “ to examine it (BUT) in its full latitude.”—— And that he—“ *intends not* here a full explication of this sort of signs.”—And yet he adds, that—“ the instances he has given in this “ one (BUT) may lead us into the contemplation “ of several *Actions of our minds* in discoursing “ which it has *found a way* to intimate to others “ by these Particles.” And these, it must be remembered, are *Actions*, or as he before termed them, THOUGHTS of our minds, for which, he has said, we have “ either none or very deficient “ names.”

Now if it had been so, (which in truth it is not) it was surely, for that reason, most especially the business of an Essay on human *understanding* to examine these signs in their *full latitude*: and to give a *full explication* of them. Instead of which, neither *Here*, nor elsewhere has Mr. Locke given *Any* explication whatever.

Though I have said much, I shall also omit much which might be added in support of this double etymology of BUT: nor should I have dwelt so long upon it but in compliment to Mr. Locke; whose opinions in any matter are not

In all these places, BUT (*i. e.* BOT, or as we now pronounce that verb *Boot*) only directs something to be added or supplied in order to make up some deficiency in Knott's expressions of “ *Prayer*, conferring of places, &c.” And so far indeed as an omission of something is improper, BUT (by ordering its insertion) may be said to “ intimate a supposition in the mind “ of the speaker of something otherwise than it should be.” But that intimation is only, as you see, by consequence; and not by the intrinsic signification of the word BUT.

slightly

slightly to be rejected, nor can they be modestly controverted without very strong arguments.

None of the Etymologists have been aware of this corrupt use of *one* word for *two*.\*

Minshew, keeping only one half of our modern BUT in contemplation, has sought for its derivation in the Latin Imperative *Putā*.—

Junius confines his explanation to the other half; which he calls its “*primariam significationem*.”

\* Nor have Etymologists been any more aware of the meaning or true derivation of the words corresponding with BUT in other languages. Vossius derives the Latin Conjunction *AT* from *ατα*; and *AST* from *AT*, “*inserto S.*” (But how or why *S.* happens to be inserted, he does not say.) Now to what purpose is such sort of Etymology? Suppose it was derived from this doubtful word *ατα*; what intelligence does this give us? Why not as well stop at the Latin word *AT*, as at the Greek word *ατα*? Is it not such sort of trifling etymology (for I will not give even that name to what is said by Scaliger and Nunnescius concerning *SED*) which has brought all etymological inquiry into disgrace?

Vossius is indeed a great authority; but, when he has nothing to justify an useless conjecture but a similarity of sound; we ought not to be afraid of opposing an appearance of reason to him.

It is contrary to the customary progress of corruption in words to derive *AST* from *AT*. Words do not gain, but lose letters in their progress: nor has unaccountable accident any share in their corruption; there is always a good reason to be given for every change they receive: and, by a good reason, I do not mean those cabalistical words *Metathesis*, *Epanthesis*, &c. by which Etymologists work such miracles; but at least a probable or anatomical reason for those not arbitrary operations.

*Adst, Adst, Ast, At.*

I am not at all afraid of being ridiculed for the above derivation, by any one who will give himself the trouble to trace the words (corresponding with BUT) of any language to their source: though they should not all be quite so obvious as the French *Mais*, the Italian *Ma*, the Spanish *Mas*, or the Dutch *Maar*.

And Skinner, willing to embrace them both, found no better method to reconcile two *contradictory* meanings, than to say hardily that the transition from one \* to the other † was—"LEVI  
"FLEXU!"

Junius says—"BUT, Chaucero T. C. V. 194.  
"bis positum pro *sine*. Primus locus est in sum-  
"mo columnæ;"—"BUT *temperance in tene*."—  
"Alter est in columnæ medio;

—"This golden carte with firy bemes bright

"Four yoked stedes, full different of hew,

"BUT baite or tiring through the spheres drew."

"ubi, tamen perperam, primo *BEST* pro BUT  
"reposueram: quod iterum delevi, cum (sub  
"finem ejusdem poematis) incidissem in hunc  
"locum;

"BUT mete or drinke she dressed her to lie

"In a darke corner of the hous alone."

"Atque adeo exinde quoque observare cæpi fre-  
"quentissimam esse hanc particulæ acceptionem.

"In *Æneide* quoque *Scoticâ* passim occurrunt,"

—"BUT *spot or falt*." 3. 58.—"BUT *cny indi-*

"*gence*." 4. 20.—"BUT *sentence or ingyne*." 5. 41.

—"Principall poet BUT *pere*." 9. 19.—"atque

"ita porro. BUT videtur dictum quasi *Be-ut*,

"pro quo Angli dicunt WITHOUT: unde quoque,

"hujus derivationis intuitu, præsens hujus par-

"ticulæ acceptio videbitur ostendere hanc esse

"primariam ejus significationem."

The extreme carelessness and ignorance of Junius, in this article, is wonderful and beneath a comment.

\* Id est, a direction to leave out something.

† Id est, a direction to superadd something.

Skinner says,—“ BUT, ut ubi dicimus—*None* “ BUT he;”—ab *A S.* Butē, Butan, *præter, nisi, sine*: Hinc, LEVI FLEXU, postea cæpit, loco “antiqui Anglo-saxonici *Ac, Sed,* designare. “ Butē autem et Butan tandem deflecti possunt “ a Præp. Be, circa; vel *Beon, esse,* et utē vel “ utan, *foris.*”

## W I T H O U T.

*But* (as distinguished from *Bot*) and *WITHOUT* have both exactly the same meaning, that is, in modern English, neither more nor less than—*Be-out.*

And they were both originally used indifferently either as Conjunctions or Prepositions. But later writers, having adopted the false notions and distinctions of language maintained by the Greek and Latin Grammarians, have successively endeavoured to make the English language conform more and more to the same rules. Accordingly *WITHOUT*, in approved modern speech,\* is now intirely confined to the office of a Preposition; and *BUT* is generally (though not always) used as a Conjunction. In the same manner as *Nisi* and *Sine* in Latin are distributed; which do both likewise mean exactly the same, with no other difference than that, in the former the negation precedes, and in the other it follows the Verb.

\* It is however used as a *Conjunction* by Lord Mansfield, in *Horne's Trial.* Page 56.

“ It cannot be read, *WITHOUT* the Attorney-General “ consents to it.”

And yet, if this reverend Earl's authority may be safely quoted for any thing, it must be for *Words.* It is so unsound in matter of law, that it is frequently rejected even *by himself.*

Skinner only says, — “ WITHOUT, ab A. S. wiðutan, extra.”

S. Johnson makes it a Preposition, an Adverb, and a Conjunction; and under the head of a Conjunction, says,—“ WITHOUT, Conjunct, Unless; if not; Except — *Not in use.*”

Its true derivation and meaning are the same as those of BUT (from Buðan.)

It is nothing but the Imperative *þýpð-utan*, from the Anglo-saxon and Gothick Verb *þeopðan*, **ÞAIKOAN**; which in the Anglo-saxon language is incorporated with the Verb *Beon*, *esse*.

## A N D

M. Casaubon supposes AND to be derived from the Greek *ετα*, *postea*.

Skinner says---“ Nescio an a Lat. *Addere*, q. d. “ *Add*; interjectâ per Epenthesein N, ut in *Render*, a *reddendo*.”

Lye supposes it to be derived from the Greek *ετι*, *adhuc*, *præterea*, *etiam*, *quinetiam*, *insuper*.

I have already given the derivation, which, I believe, will alone stand examination.

I shall only remark here, how easily men take upon trust, how willingly they are satisfied with, and how confidently they repeat after others, false explanations of what they do not understand.---Conjunctions, it seems, are to have their denomination and definition from the use to which they are applied: *per accidens*, *Essentiam*. Prepositions connect words; but—“ the Conjunction “ connects or joins together sentences; so as out “ of two to make one sentence. Thus—“ *For* “ *AND I, AND Peter, rode to London,*” is one “ sentence made up of three, &c.”

Well!



Well! So far matters seem to go on very smoothly. It is,

“*You rode, I rode, Peter rode.*”

But let us now change the instance, and try some others which are full as common, though not altogether so convenient.

*Two AND Two are four.*

*A B and B C and C D form a Triangle.*

*John AND Jane are a handsome Couple.*

Does A B form a Triangle, B C form a Triangle? &c.—Is John a Couple? Is Jane a Couple?—Are Two, four?

If the definition of a Conjunction is adhered to, I am afraid that AND, in such instances, will appear to be no more a Conjunction, (that is, a Connector of sentences) than *Though*, in the instance I have given under that word: or than *But*, in Mr. Lock's *second* Instance; or than *Else*, when called by S. Johnson a *Pronoun*; or than *Since*, when used for *Sithence* or for *Syne*. In short I am afraid that the Grammarians will scarcely have an intire Conjunction left: for I apprehend that there is not one of those words which they call Conjunctions, which is not sometimes used (and that very properly) without connecting sentences.

## L E S T

Junius only says—“LEST, *least*, minimus. v. *little*.” Under *Least*, he says—“LEAST, *left*, minimus. Contractum est ex *ελαχιστος*. v. *little*, parvus. And under *little*, to which he refers us, there is nothing to the purpose.

Skinner says—“LEST, ab A. S. Lær, *minus*, q. d. *quo minus hoc fiat*.”

S. Johnson says,—“LEST, Conj. (from the Adjective *Least*) *That not*.”

This last deduction is a curious one indeed; and it would puzzle as sagacious a reasoner as S. Johnson to supply the middle steps to his conclusion from *Least*, (which always however means *some*) to “*That not*” (which means none at all.) It seems as if, when he wrote this, he had already in his mind a presentiment of some future occasion in which such reasoning would be convenient. As thus,—“The Mother Country, the Seat of Government, must necessarily enjoy the greatest share of dignity, power, rights and privileges: an united or associated kingdom must have in some degree a smaller share: and their colonies the *least* share;”—That is (according to S. Johnson)\* *None of any kind*.

It has been proposed by no small authority (Wallis followed by Lowth) to alter the spelling of LEST to *Least*; and vice versa. “Multi, says Wallis, pro *Leſt* ſcribunt *Leaſt* (ut diſtinguatur a Conjunctiōe *Leſt*, ne, ut non :) Verum omnino contra analogiam Grammaticæ. Mallem ego Adjectivum *leſt*, Conjunctiōem *leaſt* ſcribere.”

“The superlative *Least*, says Lowth, ought rather to be written without the A; as Dr. Wallis hath long ago observed. The Conjunction of the same sound might be written “with the A, for distinction.”

\* Johnson’s merit ought not to be denied to him; but his Dictionary is the most imperfect and faulty, and the least valuable of any of his productions; and that share of merit which it possesses makes it by so much the more hurtful. I rejoice however that, though the least valuable, he found it the most profitable: for I could never read his Preface without shedding a tear.

S. Johnson

S. Johnson judiciously dissents from this proposal, but for no other reason, but because he thinks,—“ the profit is not worth the change.”

Now though they all concur in the same etymology, I will venture to affirm that *Lest*, for *Lesed*, (as *blest* for *blessed*, &c.) is nothing else but the Participle past of *Leran*, dimittere; and, with the Article *That* (either expressed or understood) means no more than *Hoc dimisso* or *Quo dimisso*.

And, if this explanation and etymology of *LEST* is right, (of which I have not the smallest doubt) it furnishes one caution more to learned Critics, not to innovate rashly: *Lest*, whilst they attempt to amend a language, as they imagine, in one trifling respect, they mar it in others of more importance; and, by their corrupt alterations and amendments, confirm error, and make the truth more difficult to be discovered by those who come after.

Mr. Locke says, and it is agreed on all sides, that—“ it is in the right use of these (*Particles*) “ that more particularly consists the clearness and “ beauty of a good stile,” and that “ these words, “ which are *not truly by themselves the names of* “ *any ideas*, are of constant and indispensable use “ in language; and do much contribute to mens “ well expressing themselves.”

Now this, I am persuaded, would never have been said, had these *Particles* been understood: for it proceeds from nothing but the difficulty of giving any rule or direction concerning their use: and that difficulty arises from a mistaken supposition that they are not “ *by themselves, the names of any ideas* :” and in that case indeed I do not see how any rational rules concerning their use  
could

could possibly be given. But I flatter myself that henceforward, the true force and nature of these words being clearly understood, the proper use of them will be so evident that any rule concerning their use will be totally unnecessary: as it would be thought absurd to inform any one that when he means to direct an addition, he should not use a word which directs to take away.

I am induced to mention this in this place, from the very improper manner in which LEST (more than any other Conjunction) is often used by our best Authors: those who are most conversant with the learned languages being most likely to make the mistake.——“*You make use of such indirect and crooked arts as these to blast my reputation, and to possess mens minds with disaffection to my person; LEST peradventure, they might with some indifferente bear reason from me.*”

*Chillingworth's Preface to the Author of Charity maintained, &c.*

Here LEST is well used,——“*You make use of these arts:*”——Why? The reason follows,——*Lereð that, i. e. Hoc dimisso,*——“*men might bear reason from me.*”——Therefore,——“*you use these arts.*”

Instances of the improper use of LEST may be found in almost every author that ever wrote in our language; because none of them have been aware of the true meaning of the word; and have been misled by supposing it to be perfectly correspondent to some Conjunctions in other languages, which it is not.

Thus *Ascham*, in his *Scholemaster*, says,——“*If a yong gentleman will venture himselfe into the company of ruffians, it is over great a jeopardie,*

LEST

“ LEST *their facions, maners, thoughts, taulke, and deedes will verie sone be over like.*”

Any tolerable judge of English will immediately perceive something aukward and improper in this sentence; though he cannot tell why. Yet the reason will be very plain to him, when he knows the meaning of these unmeaning particles (as they have been called:) for he will then see at once that LEST has no business in the sentence; there being nothing *dimisso*, in consequence of which something else would follow: and that, if he would employ LEST, the sentence must be arranged otherwise.

As,—— “ *Let not a young gentleman venture, &c. LEST his manners, thoughts, &c.*”

## S I N C E.

SINCE is a very corrupt abbreviation; confounding together different words and different combinations of words: and is therefore in modern English improperly made (like BUT) to serve purposes which no one word in any other language can answer; because the same accidental corruptions, arising from similarity of sound, have not happened in the correspondent words of any other language.

Where we now employ SINCE, was formerly (according to its respective signification) used,

Sometimes,

1. Seoððan, Sioððan, Seððan, Siððan, Siððen, Sithen, Sithence, Sithens, Sithnes, Sithns:

Sometimes,

2. Syne, Sine, Sene, Sen, Syn, Sin:

Some-

Sometimes,

3. Seand, Seeing, Seeing-that, Seeing-as, Sens, Senſe, Sence :

Sometimes,

4. Siððe, Sið, Sithe, Sith, Seen-that, Seen-as, Sens, Senſe, Sence.

Accordingly SINCE, in modern English, is used four ways. Two, as a Preposition, connecting (or rather *affecting*) words : and Two, as a Conjunction, *affecting* sentences.

When used as a Preposition, it has always the signification either of the Past Participle *seen* joined to *thence*, (that is, *seen and thence forward* :)—Or else it has the signification of the Past Participle *seen* only.

When used as a Conjunction, it has sometimes the signification of the Present Participle *Seeing* or *Seeing-that* ; and sometimes the signification of the Past Participle *Seen* or *Seen-that*.

As a Preposition,

1. SINCE (for Siððan, Sithence, or Seen *and thence forward*) ; as,

“ *Such a system of government, as the present, has not been ventured on by any King SINCE the expulsion of James the Second.* ”

2. SINCE (for Sýne, Sene, or Seen) ; as,

“ *Did George the Third reign before or SINCE that example ?* ”

As a Conjunction ;

3. SINCE (for Seand, Seeing, Seeing-as, or Seeing-that :)—as,

“ *If I should labour for any other satisfaction but that of my own mind, it would be an effect of phrenzy in me, not of hope ; SINCE it is not Truth,*  
“ *but*

“ but Opinion, that can travel the world without a  
“ passport.”

4. SINCE (for Siððe, Sith; Seen-as, or Seen-  
that);—as,

“ SINCE Death in the end takes from all, whatso-  
“ ever Fortune or Force takes from any one; it were  
“ a foolish madness in the shipwreck of worldly things,  
“ where all sinks but the sorrow, to save that.”

Junius says,—“ SINCE that time, Exinde. Con-  
tractum est ex Angl. *Sith thence*, q. d. sero post:  
“ ut *Sith* illud originem traxerit ex illo **SEIÞN**,  
“ Sero; Quod habet Arg. Cod.”

Skinner says,—“ SINCE, a Teut. **Sint** Belg.  
“ **Sind**. Post, Postea, Postquam. Doct. Th.  
“ H. putat deflexum a nostro *Sithence*. Non ab-  
“ surdum etiam esset declinare a Lat. *Exhinc*, E  
“ et H abjectis, et X facillimâ mutatione in S  
“ transeunte.” Again he says,—“ *SITH* ab A. S.  
“ Siððan, Syððan. Belg. **Seyd**, **Sint**. Post,  
“ Post illa, Postea.”

After the explanation I have given, I suppose  
it unnecessary to point out the particular errors of  
the above derivations.

*Sithence* and *Sith*, though now obsolete, con-  
tinued in good use down even to the time of the  
Stuarts.

Hooker in his writings uses *Sithence*, *Sith*,  
*Seeing* and *Since*. The two former he always pro-  
perly distinguishes; using *Sithence* for the true  
import of the Anglo-Saxon Siððan, and *Sith* for  
the true import of the Anglo-Saxon Siððe.  
Which is the more extraordinary, because authors  
of the first credit had very long before Hooker's  
time, confounded them together; and thereby  
led the way for the present indiscriminate and  
corrupt

corrupt use of SINCE in all the four cases mentioned.

*Seeing* Hooker uses sometimes, perhaps, (for it will admit a doubt) improperly. And SINCE (according to the corrupt custom which has now universally prevailed in the language) he uses indifferently either for *Sithence*, *Seen*, *Seeing*, or *Sith*.

### T H A T:

There is something so very singular in the use of this Conjunction, as it is called, that one should think it would alone, if attended to, have been sufficient to lead the Grammarians to a knowledge of most of the other Conjunctions, as well as of itself.—The use I mean is, that the Conjunction THAT generally makes a part of, and keeps company with most of the other Conjunctions.—*If that, An that, Unless that, Though that, But that, Without that, Lest that, Since that, Save that, Except that, &c.* is the construction of most of the sentences where any of those Conjunctions are used.

Is it not an obvious question then, to ask, why this Conjunction alone should be so peculiarly distinguished from all the rest of the same family? And why this alone should be able to connect itself with, and indeed be usually necessary to almost all the others? So necessary, that even when it is compounded with another Conjunction, and drawn into it so as to become one word, (as it is with *sith* and *since*) we are still forced to employ again this necessary index, in order to precede and so point out the sentence which is to be affected by the other Conjunction?

De, in the Anglo-saxon, meaning THAT, it will easily be perceived that *sith* (which is no other than



than the Anglo-saxon *sithðe*) includes *That*. But when *SINCE* is (as I here consider it) a corruption for *seeing-as* and *seen-as*, I may be asked; how does it then include *THAT*?—In short, what is *AS*? For we can gather no more from the Etymologists concerning it, than that it is derived either from *as* or from *ALS*\*: But still this explains nothing: for what *as* is, or *ALS*, remains likewise a secret.

The truth is, that *AS* is also an Article; and (however and whenever used in English) means the same as *It*, or *That*, or *Which*. In the German where it still *evidently* retains its original signification and use, (as *so* also does) it is written-*Es*.

It does not come from *Als*; any more than *Though*, and *Be-it*, and *If* (or *Gif*), &c; come from *Although*, and *Albeit*, and *Algif*, &c.—For *Als*, in our old English, is a contraction of *Al* and *Es* or *As*: and this *Al* (which in comparisons used to be very properly employed before the first *es* or *as*, but was not employed before the second) we now, in modern English, suppress: As we have also done in numberless other instances, where *All*, though not improper, is not necessary.

Thus,

“ She glides away under the foamy seas,  
“ AS swift AS darts or feather’d arrows fly.”

That is,

“ She glides away (with) *THAT* swiftness, (with) *WHICH*  
“ feather’d arrows fly.”

When

\* Junius says, —“ *AS*, *ut*, *sicut*, Græcis est *ως*.” Skinner, whom S. Johnson follows, says—“ *AS* a Teut. *Als*, *sicut*, *eliso*, *scil.* propter euphoniā intermedio *L.*”

When in old English it is written,

“ She ———

“ Glidis away under the fomy Seis,

“ Als swift as Ganze or fedderit arrow fleis.”

Then it means,

“ With ALL THAT swiftness, with WHICH, &c.”

And now I hope I may for this time take my leave of Etymology; for which I confess myself to be but very slenderly qualified. Nor should I have even sought for those derivations which I have given, if reflection had not first directed me where to seek, and convinced me that I was sure easily to find them. Nor, having found them in one language only, should I have relied on that particular instance alone on which to build a general conclusion of the proof in fact. But I am confirmed in my opinion by having found the same method of explanation successful in many other languages; and as I have before said, I know, *a priori*, that it must be so in all languages.

After what I have said, you will see plainly why so many of the Conjunctions may be used almost indifferently (or with a very little turn of expression) for each other. And without my entering into the particular minutiae in the use of each, you will easily account for the slight differences in the turn of expression, arising from different customary Abbreviations of *Construction*.

I will only give you one instance, and leave it with you for your entertainment: from which you will draw a variety of arguments and conclusions.

“ And

- “ And soft he sighed, *LEST* men might him hear.”  
 “ And soft he sighed, *ELSE* men might him hear.”  
 “ *UNLESS* he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *BUT* that he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *WITHOUT* he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *SAVE* that he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *EXCEPT* he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *OUT-CEPT* he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *OUT-TAKE* he sighed soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *IF* that he sighed *NOT* soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ And *AN* he sigh’d *NOT* soft, men might him hear.”  
 “ *SET* that he sigh’d *NOT* soft, men might him hear.”
- 

According to this account which I have given of the *Conjunctions* (and which may also be given of the *Prepositions*) Lord Monboddo will appear extremely unfortunate in the particular care he has taken (Part 2. Book i. c. 15.) to make an exception from the general rule he lays down (of the verb’s being the *parent* word of the whole language), and to caution the *candid* reader from imputing to him an opinion, that the *Conjunctions* were intended by him to be included in his rule; or had any connexion whatever with *Verbs*.

“ This so copious derivation from the Verb in  
 “ Greek, naturally leads one (says he) to suspect  
 “ that it is the *Parent* word of the whole lan-  
 “ guage: and indeed I believe that to be the  
 “ fact. For I do not know that it can be cer-  
 “ tainly shewn that there is any word that is un-  
 “ doubtedly a Primitive, which is not a Verb;  
 “ I mean a *Verb* in the stricter sense and common  
 “ acceptation of the word.---By this the candid  
 “ reader will not understand that I mean to say  
 “ that *Prepositions*, *Conjunctions*, and such like  
 “ words, which are rather the *Pegs* and *Nails*  
 E “ that

“ that fasten the several parts of the language together, than the language itself, are derived from *Verbs*, or are derivatives of any kind.”

Indeed, in my opinion, he is not less unfortunate in his *Rule* than in his *exception*. They are both equally unfounded: and yet as well founded as almost every other position which he has laid down in his two first Volumes. The whole of which is perfectly worthy of that profound Politician and Philosopher, who (Vol. I. P. 243.) esteems that to be the most perfect form, and, as he calls it, “ *the last stage of civil society*,” where Government leaves nothing to the free-will of Individuals, but interferes with the domestic, private lives of the citizens, and the education of their children! Such would in truth be the *last* stage of civil society; in the sense of the Lady in the Comedy, whose Lover having offered——  
 “ to give her the *last* proof of Love, and marry her;—she aptly replied——“ the *last* indeed: “ for there’s an end of loving.”——

But what shall we say to the bitter Irony with which Mr. Harris treats the moderns in the concluding note to his doctrine of Conjunctions? Where he says,——“ It is somewhat surprizing “ that the politest and most elegant of the Attic “ Writers, and *Plato above all the rest*, should “ have their works filled with *Particles* of all “ kinds and with *Conjunctions* in particular; while “ in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves “ as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a “ *Particle* or *Conjunction* is to be found. Is it “ that where there is connection in the meaning, “ there must be words had to connect; but that “ where the connection is little or none, such “ Connectives are of little use? That Houses of  
 “ Cards

“Cards, without *Cement*, may well answer their  
 “end, but not those houses where one would  
 “chuse to dwell? Is this the cause? Or have  
 “we attained an elegance to the Antients un-  
 “known?”

“Venimus ad summam Fortunæ, &c.”

I say, that a little more reflection and a great deal less reading, a little more attention to Common Sense \* and less blind prejudice for his Greek Commentators, would have made him a much better Grammarian, if not perhaps a Philosopher. ——— What a strange language is this to come from a man, who at the same time supposes these *Particles* and *Conjunctions* to be words *without meaning*! It should seem by this insolent pleasantry that Mr. Harris reckons it the perfection of composition and discourse to use a great many words *without meaning*! If so, perhaps *Slender's* language would meet with this learned gentleman's approbation. ———

“I keep but three men and a boy yet till my  
 “mother be dead; *But what though yet I live a*  
 “poor gentleman born.”

Now here is *cement* enough in proportion to the building. It is plain however that Shakespeare (a much better philosopher by the bye than most of those who have written philosophical treatises) was of a very different opinion in this matter from Mr. Harris. He thought the best way to make his Zany talk *unconnectedly* and nonsensically, was to give him a quantity of these beautiful

\* The author would by no means be thought to allude to the *common sense* of Doctors Oswald, Reid and Beattie; which appears to him to be sheer nonsense.

words without meaning, which are such favourites with Mr. Harris.

I shall be told, that this may be raillery perhaps, but that it is neither reasoning nor authority : that this instance does not affect Mr. Harris : for that *all cement* is no more fit to make a firm building than no cement at all : that *Slender's* discourse might have been made equally as unconnected without any particles, as with so many together : and that it is the proper mixture of particles and other words which Mr. Harris would recommend ; and that he only censures the moderns for being too sparing of Particles — To which I answer, that Reasoning disdains to be employed about such affected airs of superiority and pretended elegance. But he shall have authority, if he pleases, his favourite authority ; an Antient, a Greek, and one too writing professedly on *Plato's* opinions, and in defence of *Plato* ; and which, if Mr. Harris had not forgotten, I am persuaded he would not have contradicted. He says,— “ Il n'y a ny Beste, ny  
 “ Instrument, ny Armeure, ny autre chose quelle  
 “ qu'elle soit au monde, qui par ablation ou privation d'une siene propre partie, soit plus belle,  
 “ plus active, ne plus doulce que paravant elle  
 “ n'estoit, là où l'oraison bien souvent, en estans  
 “ les *Conjonctions* toutes estées, a une force et efficace plus affectueuse, plus active, et plus es-  
 “ mouvante. C'est pourquoy ceulx qui escri-  
 “ vent des figures de Retorique louent et prisent  
 “ grandement celle qu' ils appellent deliée, là  
 “ où ceulx cy qui sont trop religieux et qui s'assub-  
 “ jectissent trop aux regles de la grammaire, sans  
 “ oser oster une seule *Conjonction* de la commune  
 “ façon de parler, en sont à bon droit blasmez et  
 “ repris,

“ repris, comme faifans un ftile enervé fans aucune pointe d'affection et qui laffe et donne peine à ouir.” \*

And I hope this *authority* (for I will offer no *argument* to a writer of his caft) will fatisfy the—“ *true tafte and judgment in writing*” of Lord Monboddo; who with equal affectation and vanity has followed Mr. Harris in this particular: and who, though incapable of writing a fentence of common Englifh, really imagines that there is fomething captivating in his ftile, and has gratefully informed us to whose affiftance we owe the obligation.

If thefe two Gentlemen, whom I have laft mentioned, fhould be capable of receiving any mortification from the censure of one who profeffes himfelf an admirer of the—“ *vulgar and unlearned*” Mr. Locke; I will give them the confolation of acknowledging that a real Grammarian and Philofopher, J. C. Scaliger, has even exceeded them in this miftake concerning the *Particles*: for he not only maintains the fame doctrine which they have adopted; but even attempts to give reafons, *a priori*, why it is and muft be fo.

If the generous and grateful (not *candid*) reader fhould think that I have treated them with too much afperity, to him I owe fome juftification. Let him recollect then the manner in which

\* Though the found of the Greek would be more pleafing to Mr. Harris, I quote the Bifhop of Auxerre’s tranflation; becaufe I have not the original with me in prifon. At the fame time it gives me an opportunity to remind their Lordships the Bifhops of our days, of the language which that virtuous Prelate held to a Sovereign of France; that, inftead of being ready on all occafions to vote for blood and flavery, they may, from that example, learn a little more of their duty to their country and mankind.

theſe

these gentlemen and the *Common Sense Doctors* have treated the “*vulgar, unlearned, and atheistical*” Mr. Locke (for such are the imputations they cast upon that benefactor to his country); and let him condemn me, if he can.

And thus, Sir, have I finished what I at first proposed; namely, to prove that in the information against Lawley, there was not the smallest *literal* omission. In the elucidation of this I have been compelled to enter into a minute disquisition of some mistaken words, which ignorance would otherwise have employed in order to render a very plain position, ridiculous. I shall not however expect to escape ridicule: for so very disgusting is this kind of inquiry to the generality, that I have often thought it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for it was a mistake) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book, an *Essay on human Understanding*. For some part of the inestimable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have done, had he called it (what it is merely) a *grammatical Essay*, or a *Treatise on Words* or on *Language*. The human *Mind*, or the human *Understanding* appears to be a grand and noble Theme; and all men, even the most insufficient, conceive *That* to be a proper object of their contemplation: whilst Inquiries into the nature of *Language* (through which alone they can obtain any knowledge beyond the Beasts) are fallen into such extreme disrepute and contempt, that even those who “neither have the accent of christian, pagan, or man,” nor can speak so many words together with as much propriety as Balaam’s Ass did, do yet imagine *Words* to be infinitely beneath the concern of their exalted understandings!



ings ! Let these Gentlemen enjoy their laugh. I shall however be very well satisfied if I do not meet with your disapprobation : and I have endeavoured studiously to secure myself from that, by avoiding to offend you with any the smallest compliment from the beginning to the end of this letter. It is not any to declare myself, with the greatest personal affection and esteem, your most obedient and obliged humble servant,

JOHN HORNE.

King's-Bench Prison,  
April 21, 1778.









